Argyris Kriezis: The Invisible Threat: GNSS Jamming and Spoofing in Today’s World

Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) are critical infrastructure for civilian and military navigation and timing, but their weak signal strength at the Earth’s surface makes them highly vulnerable to radio frequency interference (RFI) including jamming, which blocks signals outright, and spoofing, which feeds receivers false position and timing data. GNSS interference has been recorded for years, but since the outbreak of conflicts in Ukraine, Israel, and Iran, such events have grown in number, strength, and duration. Because GNSS signals serve both civilian and military users, disruptions intended for military targets often spill over, disrupting civilian infrastructure hundreds of kilometers from active conflict zones. 

This seminar presents research from a collaboration between the Stanford GPS Lab and other universities to detect, characterize, and geolocate sources of GNSS interference affecting civilian infrastructure worldwide. By examining these events, Argyris Kriezis assesses the sophistication, impact, and scope of such attacks. Because interference often originates across borders or in regions where direct mitigation is difficult, the work focuses on developing early-warning technologies that can alert authorities in time to eliminate the source or mitigate its effects on critical civilian and military systems.