Last Monday, June 22, 2026, the White House released two executive orders focused on quantum technology. Together, they reinforce the priorities established in prior U.S. quantum policies, such as the National Quantum Initiative Act introduced in 2018, while creating more firm implementation and deployment deadlines and clarifying key governmental actors to facilitate prioritized efforts. Specifically, they urge federal agencies to accelerate the adoption of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) and deployment of quantum technologies, while maintaining “robust and balanced security controls to safeguard critical information and protect national security interests.” This Brisk Assessment summarizes the key takeaways from each of the executive orders and highlights forthcoming work at the Berkeley Risk and Security Lab (BRSL) on quantum security issues.

Executive Order 1: “Ushering in the Next Frontier of Quantum Innovation”

The first executive order recognizes that “quantum information science and technology (QIST) will provide transformational capabilities that will drive American innovation, power economic growth, generate high-paying jobs, and bolster national security” and calls for a “whole-of-government approach to accelerate deployment and commercialization” of quantum technologies. In addition to directing interagency collaboration to foster innovation and commercialization of quantum technologies, it emphasizes that the United States “must protect sensitive technologies and work with allies to ensure adversaries cannot use QIST to undermine national security.” 

Specifically, it calls for interagency collaboration to update the National Quantum Strategy, and subsequent reports by executive departments and agencies on steps taken to adhere to the new strategy. It also catalyzes three key efforts:

1. Achieving quantum computing at the scale necessary for applications and scientific discovery. The order establishes a Quantum Computer for Application Development and Discovery Science (QC-ADDS) Effort, prescribing interagency and public-private partnerships to support the goal of establishing at least one “quantum computer at a scale intended to initiate the era of quantum-enabled scientific discovery” at a Department of Energy facility. It also calls for improved benchmarking standards to address the current lack of consistent metrics for assessing quantum computing progress and suitability for particular applications.
2. Deployment of quantum sensors and networks. The order targets September 30, 2028 as the deadline for fielding three federal “next-generation quantum sensor projects.” Similar to the QC-ADDS effort, it directs interagency coordination to identify key applications across different domains and prioritize the transition of promising technologies to deployment and commercialization stages.
3. Reinforcing the domestic innovation ecosystem and recruiting a robust workforce. The order urges agencies to identify ways to both bolster the domestic quantum innovation ecosystem through improving domestic fabrication infrastructure, monitoring supply chains, and expanding the quantum workforce (including ensuring access to international research collaboration with allied countries). At the same time, it calls for an expansion of the Quantum Information Science and Technology Counterintelligence Protection Team (QCPT) and “controls to safeguard critical information and protect national security interests,” signalling a continued concern about “technology leakage” and foreign acquisition of sensitive quantum research and technologies.

Executive Order 2: “Securing the Nation Against Cryptographic Attacks”

The second executive order is more narrowly focused on the PQC transition. It establishes measures to coordinate a transition to National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-approved Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for PQC algorithms among federal agencies and critical infrastructure operators. In implementing this transition, federal agencies are tasked with providing an inventory of their high-value assets and high-impact systems and transitioning these assets and systems to use PQC for key establishment by December 31, 2030 and to use PQC for digital signatures by December 31, 2031. It also directs the State Department to lead efforts to engage with key foreign governments and industry groups and encourage their transition to NIST-standardized PQC algorithms and the Department of Homeland Security to aid critical infrastructure operators with PQC transitions.

BRSL Quantum Security Initiative Research Priorities

BRSL’s quantum security initiative applies academically rigorous methods to produce empirically-informed research exploring the security and policy questions raised by quantum technologies. Our quantum security research agenda has three prongs: 

1. Identifying and evaluating strategic implications of quantum technologies. Claims about the strategic implications of quantum technologies often lack the rigorous technical analysis required to cut through uncertainty over reasonable quantum technology development timelines and to anticipate how quantum technologies will perform in strategic settings. At BRSL, we are evaluating specific applications that could yield significant strategic implications, such as the use of quantum sensors for improving submarine detection or missile accuracy, by integrating technical assessments of existing and emerging sensing technologies with open-source analysis of operational constraints when deploying these sensors in strategic domains. A forthcoming article by research scholar Lindsay Rand will be published in Security Studies later this summer examining implications of quantum sensors for nuclear second-strike capabilities. Future work will examine broader applications for quantum sensors in undersea and aeronautical domains.
2. Exploring challenges and opportunities for PQC implementation. The implementation of PQC solutions raises numerous policy questions and challenges. Specifically, it illuminates a key tension between theoretically robust PQC solutions and flexible/practical PQC solutions. To explore this tension, we are conducting case study analyses of how PQC algorithms will perform against various attack types, and exploring challenges associated with patch implementation as well as policy approaches that will afford greater adaptability as the threat landscape evolves. Later this summer, Lindsay Rand and undergraduate researcher Cole Junge will publish this case study analysis and host an informational webinar.
3. Assessing the quantum technology ecosystem and supply chain vulnerabilities. The quantum innovation ecosystem is reliant on a complex web of public-private research partnerships and funding networks, as well as an immense and diverse supply chain. To better understand the needs of the quantum innovation ecosystem, we are collecting and analyzing publicly available data on quantum research groups and publications using mapping and network analysis methods. We are also using these methods to collect data on and evaluate sub-ecosystems for critical supply chain components. BRSL affiliate Ben Winter recently published a white paper evaluating the efficacy and challenges of quantum export controls, drawing on engagement with academics, policymakers, and analysts. Forthcoming work includes a journal article by undergraduate researcher Yixuan Wei examining how U.S. policies have impacted collaboration between U.S. research groups and those in allied countries, and a BRSL report by Lindsay Rand and Timothy Jan on helium-3 as a critical supply chain node.

If you’re interested in following this research or connecting to discuss opportunities for collaboration, contact our communications team or reach out directly to the quantum security initiative lead, Dr. Lindsay Rand.